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1 Introduction
In June 2005, the Danish Minister of Employment Claus Hjort Frederiksen claimed at a confer-
ence on flexicurity that: “the Danish flexicurity model has been proclaimed to be the panacea
that will solve all the problems on the French labour market (...) And there are many good
reasons why the French are looking to Denmark for inspiration: 1) Denmark is among the Eu-
ropean countries with the highest employment rates and the lowest unemployment rates. 2)
Danish employees are in the forefront internationally when it comes to how they see their job
security. 3) Denmark is also in the top class as regards job satisfaction”.1
The Danes can be proud: the Danish flexicurity model does not look attractive only in
France. It is attractive for many European countries because it has been able to combine high
participation rates with generous safety nets. For a decade now, the European Commission
advised European countries to adopt the main features of the flexicurity model in order to
increase labor market efficiency. Yet, although many features of the Danish Model look ideal
for the European Commission, the labor market institutions and labor market outcomes of
European countries are still very different from those of Denmark. The most striking difference
is to be found in the combination of unemployment benefits and job protection, which are the
main devices to protect workers against the risk of unemployment. As shown in Figure 1,2 a
trade-off shows up between unemployment benefits and employment protection in European
countries (see Boeri et al., 2004, and Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005). Mediterranean countries
and (to a lesser extent) Continental European countries have lower unemployment benefits but
more stringent job protection compared to Denmark, which appears as a clear outlier on this
issue.
As noted by Freeman (2000), the emergence of a set of labor market institutions heralded
by policy analysts and economists is not new. And Freeman argues that diversity of labor
market institutions among advanced countries stems from cross-country differences in values
over distributional issues because labor market institutions have large effects on distribution,
but modest hard-to-uncover effects on efficiency. This relativist conception, according to which
the choice of labor market institutions is a matter of taste, unrelated to efficiency, is often
advocated. For instance, some contributions have claimed that differences in labor market
1This speech is available at http://www.bm.dk/ministeren/taler/050616_uk.asp.
2The figures of the introduction are focused on European countries only. The trade-off between unemployment
benefits and legislation protecting employment is less clear-cut in a two dimensional space when other countries
are accounted for. In particular, Anglo-Saxon countries, in which there is less redistribution of income, have
lower unemployment benefits than expected because unemployment benefits are influenced by insurance and
redistributional purposes. Such effects are taken into account in the empirical section of the paper. Unemployment
benefits are computed as the share of GDP per capita expenditure per unemployed worker provided by the OECD.
Job protection is proxied by the OECD index on regular and temporary contracts (EPL1 indicator).
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Figure 1: Unemployment benefits and Job protection in the end of the 1990s. Source: OECD.
institutions and outcomes are rooted in the higher weight put on home production in European
countries (Rogerson, 2003, Freeman and Shettkat, 2005), or come from stronger preferences
for leisure (Blanchard, 2004, Alesina et al., 2005) and from more traditional family values in
Continental European countries and Mediterranean countries (Algan and Cahuc, 2005).
The efficiency of the Danish flexicurity Model seems to contradict this common relativist
stand. Figure 2 shows that European countries with high unemployment benefits and weak job
protection ratio are also those in which participation rates are high.3 Moreover, studies based
on individual subjective data suggest that individuals feel better protected by unemployment
benefits rather than by employment protection (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005).
From this perspective, it becomes hard to understand why European countries do not im-
plement the flexicurity model. The aim of our paper is to provide an explanation for this
puzzle. We argue that the flexicurity model is hardly sustainable in countries displaying weak
public-spiritedness because the unemployment insurance design raises moral hazard issues that
are much more difficult to overcome in countries where individuals are more prone to cheat
over government benefits. Besides, we are also able to document that civic attitudes cannot be
systematically changed quickly just by changing institutions. This result has far-reaching conse-
quences for the policy reforms agenda. It indicates that civic attitudes impose real constraints
3This Figure, which is provided for an illustrative purpose, should not be over interpreted. The econometric
section of the paper provides much more rigorous empirical evidence on the link between unemployment benefits
and job protection on one hand, and labor market performance on the other hand.
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Figure 2: Unemployment benefits, job protection and participation rate in the end of the 1990s.
Source: OECD.
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on the choice of labor market institutions. From this point of view, it is unlikely that countries
with weak public-spiritedness can implement the Danish Model without specific action aimed
at changing the values of their citizens.4
It is worth noticing that our conclusions are in line with those of the literature focused on the
interactions between culture, institutions and economic outcomes. This literature, which recently
had a new start in economics thanks to the availability of new international surveys,5 shows
that individuals’ preferences and priors are rooted in cultural orientations acquired through
socialization within a society’s historical heritage. Moreover, those priors and preferences have
an impact on outcomes. For instance, cultural differences turn out to have an impact on savings
across countries (Guiso et al., 2005), but also on fertility rates (Fernandez et al., 2004, Fernandez
and Fogli., 2005), on employment rates (Algan and Cahuc, 2005, Fernandez and Fogli., 2005), on
individuals’ prior on social mobility (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004) and on trust shown towards a
third party (Guiso et al., 2003). In the same spirit, the paper of Ichino and Maggi (2000), which
documents the existence of north-south regional differences in regard to shirking of responsibility
in a large Italian bank, suggests that the degree of ‘civicness’ is influenced by individuals’
historical heritage.6 This literature has also stressed that the degree of trust and of ‘civicness’
has an impact on economic outcome. For instance, Guiso et al. (2004) find that a country whose
residents trust residents of another country more tend to exchange more goods and financial
assets with it. Tabellini (2005) estimates that GDP per capita and growth are higher in European
regions that exhibit higher degree of values such as trust, respect for others, and confidence in
individual self-determination. Tabellini shows that those values are related to historical variables
such as the literacy rate at the end of the 19th century, and the political institutions in place
over the past several centuries. From this point of view, the customary priors and preferences
that ethnic and social groups transmit seem to remain fairly unchanged across generations. All
these findings are in line with our results, which are obtained in two steps.
First (section 2), we provide a model in which unemployment insurance and job protection
are shaped by a government7 which implements a policy platform that has won an electoral
4Blanchard and Philippon (2004) follow a similar route by showing that the cross-country heterogeneity in the
quality of labor relations between employers and employees is deeply ingrained in cultural features.
5See the survey of Guiso et al. (2005).
6This idea has been explored in sociology and political science by Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993).
7 In the seminal papers of the “implicit contract” (Baily, 1974, Azariadis, 1975), unemployment insurance is
provided by employers. However, in the real world, unemployment insurance is always provided by government or
public agencies and not by firms because selection and moral hazard problems prevent firms offering unemployment
benefits (Kiander, 1993, Chui and Karni, 1998). When unemployment insurance is provided by public authorities,
it is worth introducing employment protection, under the form of layoff taxes, to induce firms to take account
of the fiscal externalities linked to their job destruction decisions (Feldstein, 1976, Burdett and Wright, 1989a,b,
Blanchard and Tirole, 2004).
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competition.8 This model shows that the provision of unemployment insurance is more costly in
economies in which civic attitudes make it more acceptable to cheat on unemployment benefits,
leading the government to provide lower unemployment benefits. Conversely, employees are
protected thanks to more stringent employment protection. But the lack of unemployment
insurance due to moral hazard is detrimental to labor market participation. In this context,
moral hazard hampers government’s ability to implement efficient labor market institutions
which undermines participation rates.
Secondly (section 3), we use international individual surveys to document how attitudes to-
ward government benefits are shaped to a large extent by country specific effects. Additionally,
we highlight the link between civic attitudes and behavior towards government benefits: we
show that individuals who exhibit low concern for civic values are more often unemployed when
they can benefit from generous government benefits and, conversely, less often unemployed if job
offers are scarce due to stringent employment protection legislation. Aggregate panel data also
show that countries in which a large fraction of the population considers that it is not justifiable
to claim government benefits to which you are not entitled also have high unemployment ben-
efits, low job protection and high participation rates. Obviously, the correlation between civic
attitudes and the design of labor market institutions does not mean that the causal relation
goes from social attitudes to the unemployment benefits/employment protection ratio. Yet we
provide some evidence of such a causal relationship by showing that people who face the same
economic environment by living in the same country, but who differ in the national origin of
their ancestors, have significantly different attitudes towards government benefits. The influence
of national backgrounds still holds when controlling for the individual socioeconomic character-
istics.9 Moreover, their civic attitudes are perfectly in line with those currently expressed in their
country of origin. This suggests that civic attitudes towards government benefits are rooted in
country specific features which have long lasting effects on individuals.
8Electoral competition is represented by the probabilistic voting model: see Persson and Tabelini (2000).
9This type of empirical strategy has been used by Reimers (1985), Blau (1992), Carroll et al. (1999), Antecol
(2000), Guinnane et al. (2002), Giuliano (2004), Fernandez and Fogli (2005) and Algan and Cahuc (2005). Blau
(1992) and Guinnane et al. (2002) examine whether the fertility of immigrants differs from that of the native
born in the US. Reimers (1985) and Antecol (2000) study the effect of the country of origin on the labor force
participation of immigrants. Using the same approach, Giuliano (2004) focuses on family leaving arrangements
and Fernandez and Fogli (2005) analyse female labor participation and fertility. Caroll et al. (1999) use this
approach for the analysis of saving behavior. Algan and Cahuc (2005) look at family values. All these studies
find a significant influence of the country of origin on cultural values, behavior and economic outcomes.
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2 The model
We consider an economy in which a numeraire good is produced thanks to labor. There is a
continuum of mass 1 of individuals. Individuals differ in their taste for leisure whose continu-
ous differentiable cumulative distribution function is denoted by H(h) : R→ [0, 1] . As regards
consumption and leisure, the preferences of the type-h individuals are represented by the utility
function v(c) + ℓh, where c ≥ 0 stands for consumption, v is an increasing, concave and twice
derivable function, and ℓ denotes leisure. Inactive individuals get ℓ = 1 and c = 0. Active indi-
viduals can be either employed or unemployed. Employed workers get a wage, denoted by w, but
do not benefit from any leisure: ℓ = 0. Thus, the utility level of an employee amounts to v(w).
Unemployed workers get unemployment benefits, provided by the government, denoted by b.
Unemployed workers choose a level of search effort that could be either low or high because the
government cannot perfectly monitor search activity. The utility level of unemployed workers
who produce the high level of search effort is worth v(b) because the leisure cost of the high
search effort is assumed to be the same as the leisure cost of waged work. The utility level of
unemployed workers who produce the low level of search effort amounts to v(b) + (1− α)h− γ.
The term (1 − α)h shows up because job search effort is not perfectly monitored by the gov-
ernment: the government can force job seekers to devote only a share α ∈ (0, 1) to job search
activities. γ ≥ 0 stands for the utility loss induced by individuals’ feeling of guilt about cheating
on unemployment benefits. In the following, we focus on the consequences of such guilty feelings
on the design of unemployment insurance and job protection.
There is potentially a large number of firms that can create jobs. Creating a job entails
fixed costs denoted by k > 0. A job produces x units of the numeraire good, where x ∈ R
is an idiosyncratic shock drawn in a distribution with a continuous differentiable cumulative
distribution function denoted by G. The productivity shock, x, which is private information
held by the firm, is not contractible. Firms enter into competition to offer wages to workers. As
workers are assumed to be perfectly mobile, competition between firms entails zero profit.
There is a government which provides unemployment benefits, financed by payroll taxes,
denoted by τ , and by layoff taxes, denoted by f. The policy of the government is determined by
elections.
The time sequence of events runs as follows:
1) Individuals vote on the policy platforms (τ , f, b).
2) Individuals decide whether to be active or not.
3)Workers choose their level of search effort. Only workers who produce the high level of search
effort are matched with firms. The others are unemployed and get the unemployment benefits
6
b.
4) Employers compete to hire workers.
5) The idiosyncratic productivity shocks x occur and employers decide whether they keep the
workers or they cut the jobs. Then, employers pay wages and payroll taxes on every continuing
job. Every job-cut gives rise to the payment of layoff taxes. Employed workers get the wage w,
unemployed workers get unemployment benefits b.
This problem can be solved by backward induction. The market equilibrium is solved in the
first stage. Then, the outcome of elections is determined.
Market equilibrium
Market equilibrium yields labor contracts that allow workers to achieve the maximum level
of expected utility compatible with zero expected profits. Labor contracts only include wages
since the reservation value of the productivity parameter x is not contractible and firms cannot
commit ex-ante to this reservation value by keeping aside funds payable to a third party in
case of layoff (see the discussion in Blanchard and Tirole, 2004). Accordingly, at step 5) firms
destroy jobs if - and only if - their profits, x−w− τ , are lower than their destruction costs, −f.
The job destruction decision boils down to the choice of a reservation value for the productivity
parameter x, denoted by X, below which jobs are destroyed. The reservation productivity reads:
X = w+ τ − f. (1)
The job destruction rate is equal to G(X). Given the expression X of the reservation pro-
ductivity, there is a single value10 of the wage compatible with the zero profit condition∫ +∞
X
(x−w − τ) dG(x)−G(X)f = k. (2)
Individuals whose utility in inactivity, v(0) + h, is lower than their expected utility when
they are active decide to enter into the labor market. The expected utility of a type-h active
individual is
V = max {[1−G(X)] v(w) +G(X)v(b), v(b) + (1− α)h− γ} .
10As the expected profit decreases with respect to w, there is a single positive equilibrium value for the wage if
- and only if - the two following conditions are fulfilled:∫ +∞
τ−f
(x− τ) dG(x)−G(τ − f)f − k > 0,
limw→∞
∫ +∞
w+τ−f
(x− w − τ ) dG(x)−G(w + τ − f)f − k < 0.
These conditions are assumed to be fulfilled.
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Therefore, the threshold value h¯ of the taste for leisure below which individuals enter into the
labor market solves
v(0) + h¯ = max{[1−G(X)] v(w) +G(X)v(b), v(b) + (1− α)h¯− γ} , (3)
and the participation rate amounts to H(h¯).
Equations (1), (2) and (3) define the market equilibrium value of the wage w, the reser-
vation productivity X and the participation rate H(h¯). Let us now analyze the choice of the
unemployment benefits, the payroll taxes and the layoff taxes.
Equilibrium policy
The elections are represented by the probabilistic voting model (see Persson and Tabelini,
2000, chapter 3) in which there are two candidates who announce their electoral platforms si-
multaneously and non-cooperatively. Then, individuals, who are influenced by ideological biases,
vote. The candidate who gets the majority is elected and implements her announced policy plat-
form. Under certain assumptions for simplification, which are adopted henceforth, the outcome
of the vote maximizes the sum of expected utilities.11 Accordingly, the optimal choice of the
elected candidate maximizes∫ h¯
0
{[1−G(X)] v(w) +G(X)v(b)}dH(h) +
∫ +∞
h¯
[v(0) + h]dH(h),
subject to four constraints.12
1. The incentive compatibility constraint
[1−G(X)] v(w) +G(X)v(b) ≥ v(b) + (1− α)h− γ,∀h ≤ h¯. (4)
2. The government balanced budget constraint:
[τ [1−G(X)] + (f − b)G(X)]H(h¯) = 0. (5)
3. The zero profit condition (2).
4. The participation constraint (3).
11This outcome can be derived from the simple case in which each group of individuals of type-h is heterogeneous
with respect to ideological biases towards the two candidates. Then, following Persson and Tabelini (2000) it turns
out that the outcome of the elections maximizes the utilitarian criterion if the ideological bias is represented by
an additive term in the utility function and is distributed with a uniform distribution that is the same for all
type-h individuals.
12We apply the revelation principle.
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It is useful to rewrite this program as the maximization of the sum of expected utilities
with respect to (w,X, b) subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (4), the participation
constraint (3) and to the equation∫ +∞
X
(x−w) dG(x)−G(X)b = k, (6)
that is obtained by summing up the balanced budget constraint of the government (5) and the
zero profit condition (2). Then, once the optimal value of (w,X, b) is determined, it is possible
to use equations (1) and (2) to find out the optimal value of (τ , f, b) .
The computation of the optimal values for (w,X, b) , presented in appendix A, allows us to
claim that:
Result 1: Full insurance, with w = b, can be obtained only if utility losses induced by guilt
feelings are sufficiently large.
When the utility cost of cheating on unemployment benefits is high, the incentive compati-
bility condition (4) is not binding and the government can provide full insurance. It also turns
out that the reservation productivity amounts to zero (X = 0) when individuals are perfectly
insured. Otherwise, the optimal value of (w,X, b) is defined by equation (6) and by:
X = w − b− v(w)− v(b)v′(w) , (7)
v(w)− v(b) = (1− α) [v(b)− v(0)]− γα [1−G(X)] . (8)
Equation (8) is merely the binding incentive compatibility condition, which shows that the
wage is larger than the unemployment benefits if utility losses associated with guilt feelings are
small enough.13 Equation (7) shows that the government decides to keep jobs filled up to the
point where the utility cost (in numeraire good units) of job destruction, v(w)−v(b)v′(w) , is equal to
the gains of job destruction, w− b− x.
These two equations allow us to claim the following result which is proved in appendix B:
Result 2: The unemployment benefits and the reservation productivity increase with respect to
feelings of guilt.
Result 2 can be understood as follows. First, when feelings of guilt are lower, unemployment
benefits are decreased to insure that workers devote sufficient effort to job search. Furthermore,
13A more rigourous presentation is provided in appendix A.
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when guilt feelings are decreased, as v(w) − v(b) = (1−α)[v(b)−v(0)]−γα[1−G(X)] , the utility cost of job
destruction is increased and the optimal reservation productivity drops.
The scheme (τ , f, b) that allows the government to implement the optimal value of (w,X, b)
is defined by equation (7), by the definition of the reservation productivity (1) and by the zero
profit condition (2) which reads, using (1):
f =
∫ +∞
X
(x−X)dG(x)− k.
This last expression of the zero profit condition implies that layoff taxes decrease with the
reservation productivity, which leads to the following result:
Result 3: Layoff taxes decrease with respect to feelings of guilt.
The following result is also proved in appendix C:
Result 4: The expected utility of active workers and the participation rate are lower when there
are less feelings of guilt.
The participation rate H(h¯) increases with γ since the optimal response of the government
is to provide less insurance against productivity shocks when it becomes less costly to cheat
on unemployment benefits: unemployment benefits are lower and employment protection more
stringent. The lower degree of insurance, which decreases the expected utility of active indi-
viduals, implies that labor market participation falls. Thus, in equilibrium, any increase in
the utility cost of guilty feelings allows individuals to reach better allocations according to the
Pareto criterion. From this perspective, more public-spiritedness improves efficiency.
The next section provides empirical tests of the main predictions of the theoretical model, ac-
cording to which better civic attitudes towards government benefits lead to lower job protection,
higher unemployment benefits and higher participation rates.
3 Empirical results
In this section we document to what extent people living in different OECD countries differ
in their civic attitudes towards government benefits. Then, we provide evidence showing that
cross country differences in civic attitudes and economic behaviors are rooted in national cultural
values that shape employment protection and unemployment benefits legislations. Our empirical
strategy is organized in four steps.
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Firstly, we show that civic attitudes are correlated with country specific features rather than
with individual characteristics, providing a rationale for the observed cross-country heterogeneity
in labor market institutions.
Secondly, we uncover the causal link between civic attitudes and institutions by documenting
the inertia of civic attitudes with respect to changes in the economic and institutional environ-
ment. It might be the case that civic values are strongly influenced by the current features of
the national institutions. For instance people might feel less guilty about cheating on taxes in
countries plagued by administrative inefficiencies. Or people could feel guiltier if they live in an
environment in which everybody checks the attitude of others. But the relationship could also
go the other way around: civic attitudes might be difficult to change because they are deeply
rooted in specific culture and people facing the same incentives could react differently depending
on their cultural background. The scope for policy reforms largely depends on the answer to
this issue. If civic attitudes are strongly influenced by current institutions, there is room for
policy actions on the labor market which could quickly change individual behavior. If culture
matters and has a long lasting effects on civic attitudes, then this cannot be changed quickly by
alterations to labor market institutions. The Danish flexicurity model cannot be implemented
without specific actions aimed at changing civic attitudes.
To tackle this issue, we analyze civic attitudes of people who come from different national
origins but who face the same economic environment, living in the same country, namely the
United States. It turns out that there is a strong inertia in civic attitudes and that it is culture
which truly matters in this realm.
Third, we document the link between civic attitudes and individual behavior. We show
that individuals who exhibit low concern for civic values are also more frequently unemployed.
Furthermore, these individuals have an increased probability of being unemployed in order to
take advantage of generous government benefits and, conversely, a lower probability of being
unemployed if job offers are scarce due to stringent employment protection legislation. This
step leads us to conclude that national cultural features have long lasting and consistent effects
on both civic virtue and economic behavior.
Then, as a fourth and last step, we estimate the aggregate outcomes of such individual values
and economic behavior in OECD countries over the period 1980-2003. We show a significant
correlation between civic attitudes, on one hand, and job protection and unemployment benefits,
on the other hand, which can be interpreted as a direct causal outcome of civic attitudes to
institutions.
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3.1 Cross countries heterogeneity in civic attitudes and economic behaviors
3.1.1 Database on civic attitudes
The measure of cross-country differences in civic attitudes is based on two international so-
cial surveys: the World Value Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP). The key advantage of these surveys is that they provide harmonized questions on civic at-
titudes for an extensive set of countries, including OECD countries, Eastern European countries
and Latin American countries. The WVS covers three main waves (1980, 1990, 1999-2001)14
and the ISSP provides specific questions on civic attitudes in two surveys on religion in 1991
and 1998. These two different databases are complementary in as much as they report the same
kind of questions on civic attitudes but provide different controls to estimate the determinants of
public-spiritedness. The WVS covers a larger set of countries and a greater time-span than the
ISSP. But the latter database provides information on the countries of origin for the ancestors
of the respondent, allowing us to push further the analysis of the cultural foundations of civic
attitudes.
In both surveys respondents were asked a question directly related to civic attitudes to-
wards government benefits. The question reported in the WVS database reads as follows: “Do
you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in between to claim govern-
ment/state benefits to which you have no rights”. The answers are given on an ordered scale
from 1 for “Never justifiable” to 10 for “Always justifiable”. The wording in the ISSP database
is somewhat similar: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a person gives the government
incorrect information about himself/herself to get government benefits that she/ he is not entitled
to?”. The answer ranges from 1 to 4, which correspond to “Seriously wrong”, “Wrong”, “A bit
wrong” and “Not wrong”. To ease the interpretation of the results, we group the answer cate-
gories together to represent individuals with strong civic attitudes. Hence we create a dummy
variable which takes on the value 1 if the respondent answered “Seriously wrong” in the ISSP
and “Never justifiable” in theWVS, and 0 otherwise. As a robustness check, all the estimations
have also been run on the original variables without any significant changes in the results (see
Appendix E).
The analysis includes the main OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. We also include Chile in order to get
richer information on Latin American countries. Actually, Latin American countries provide a
14The World Value Survey also had a wave in 1995 but for a smaller set of countries and questions.
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useful benchmark of comparison since they display even higher levels of employment protection
and lower level of unemployment benefits than Mediterranean countries. Eventually, we also
analyze the situation of formerly planned economies: Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and
Slovakia. To some extent these countries provide an insightful natural experiment since they
have implemented from scratch different designs of labor market institutions following a common
shock caused by the fall of Communism. By grouping the different countries and different waves
together, this selection leaves us with 76221 working aged individuals in the WVS and 33027
working aged individuals in the ISSP database. The number of observations by country reaches
at least 1031 individuals in the WVS database and 850 individuals in the ISSP database (see
Appendix D for the summary statistics by country).
3.1.2 Cross-country heterogeneity in civic attitudes
Figure 3 reports the basic mean reply to our main question of interest concerning government
benefits as an average over the three main waves of theWVS. This figure already highlights im-
portant facts. Firstly, a much larger share of individuals in Nordic countries, compared to other
countries display strong civic attitudes. Denmark is a clear outlier with 88 percent of house-
holds who strongly blame the fact of cheating over government benefits. Such a civic stand is
shared by almost 80 percent of individuals in other Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden or
Netherlands. Secondly the other European countries lag far behind their Nordic counterparts.
They are on average no more than 65 percent to blame uncivil behavior in Continental European
and Mediterranean countries. Thirdly the former planned economies in Eastern Europe and the
Latin American countries resemble the Continental and Mediterranean European countries. The
only outlier is Hungary, which is much closer to Nordic countries on this issue; this is consistent
with the fact that this country is the only one to have implemented generous unemployment
insurance in Eastern Europe. Fourthly, the Anglo-Saxon countries stand at an intermediate po-
sition between Nordic countries and the others with more than 70 percent of household blaming
uncivil attitudes. At first sight this ordering of country closely resembles the heterogeneity in
the design of labor market institutions displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 4 also shows that civic attitudes are rather stable over time. It turns out that there
is a strong correlation, within each country,15 between the share of people who think that it is
never justifiable to cheat on government benefits in 1980 and in 2000. Accordingly, the ordering
of countries as regards civic attitudes remains stable over time.
15The WVS provides information only for 15 countries among the 25 countries of our sample in 1980.
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Figure 3: Mean reply to the question: “Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified
or something in between to claim government/state benefits to which you have no rights”. The
score associated with the answer ‘never’ is 1, the score of other answers is zero. Source: WVS,
1980, 1990, 1999—2001.
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Figure 4: Mean reply to the question: “Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified
or something in between to claim government/state benefits to which you have no rights”. The
score associated with the answer ‘never’ is 1, the score of other answers is zero. Source: WVS,
1980, 1999—2001.
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3.2 The determinants of civic attitudes
The observation of cross-country stable differences in civic attitudes leaves the roots of such
differences unexplained . We proceed in two steps in order to shed some light on this issue.
Firstly, we document the relation between civic attitudes and individual characteristics.
This first step allows us to show that civic attitudes are strongly correlated with home country
fixed effects capturing specific national features. Secondly, we delve further into the influence
of national features by disentangling the cultural influence from other national economic and
institutional environment. The analysis of civic attitudes of people of various different national
origins, who face the same economic environment by living in the same country, allows us to
show that cultural values have long lasting effects on civic attitudes. This analysis sheds light
on the causal link between cultural backgrounds and individual civic values.
3.2.1 Civic attitudes and national features
The issue at stake is whether the observed cross-country heterogeneity in civic attitudes is
correlated to individual characteristics or rather to country-specific effects. We thus estimate
the specific effect of national features in the answers to the WVS question regarding attitudes
towards cheating on government benefits. The dependent variable still takes the value 1 if the
respondent thinks that cheating on government benefits is never justifiable and 0 otherwise.
The national features are proxied by country dummies. Denmark is considered as the reference
group since this country always displays the highest average level of civic attitude in this realm.
To disentangle the country-specific effect, we also control for the main individual characteristics
such as gender, age and age squared, the number of years of education, employment status,
income category, political orientation and religious affiliation. This estimation is run on the
three main waves of the WVS (1980,1990,1999-2001). We do not merge the estimations on the
WVS and the ISSP since the question of interest is not originally coded in the same manner
across the two databases. Yet, the results are not significantly changed if we run the estimation
on the ISSP database (see next section).
Table 1 reports the probit estimates of the question on government benefits. Table 1 shows
that all country dummies are significant at the 1 percent level. The marginal coefficients of each
country are reported in Figure 5. They indicate to what extent living in countries other than
Denmark lowers the probability of displaying good civic attitudes. The coefficients go from 0 for
the reference group (Denmark) to −.58 for individuals living in Greece, which displays the lowest
level of civic attitudes. Let us focus on the groups of countries with the highest gap compared
to Denmark. One of them is made up of Latin American and Mediterranean countries. The
15
probability of having good civic attitudes decreases by 54 percent in Mexico, by 32 percent in
Spain, 29 percent in Portugal and 25 percent in Italy. Another distinctive group consists of
Eastern countries in which the probability of sharing high civic stands decreases by 35 percent
in Slovakia or by 33 percent in Poland. It is noteworthy to stress the existence of an outlier
(Hungary) which displays civic attitudes more comparable to those of Continental European
countries. This result fits in squarely with the fact that Hungary is the only Eastern country to
have implemented a high level of unemployment benefits. The group of countries much closer
to Denmark is made up of Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries. Living in Norway or in Australia
instead of Denmark decreases the probability of good civic attitudes by only 6 and 12 percent
respectively. The striking result is that this ordering of countries closely matches that of the
unemployment benefits-employment protection trade-off.
It is also noteworthy to compare the size of the estimated country coefficients with that of the
individual characteristics. Table 1 reports that the probability of considering it unjustifiable to
cheat on government benefits increases with the level of education, the age and whether someone
is employed rather than unemployed. Strikingly enough, people leaning to the right and to the
Protestant religious affiliation also display better civic attitudes. But importantly enough, it
turns out that coefficients of individual controls are much smaller than those associated with
the country dummies. In terms of marginal effect,16 the probability of thinking that cheating
on government benefits is never justifiable increases by 3 percent if the respondent is Protestant
rather than non religious or by 1 percent by each year of education.
As a matter of fact, the level of civic attitudes is mainly driven by national features. Fig 6
highlights this finding by showing the correlation between the mean reply to the question and
the probit estimates of the coefficients associated with each country dummy. The correlation
is almost perfect yielding a coefficient of determination of 0.86. Thus the key to understanding
the cross-country heterogeneity in civic attitudes is to look at specific national features.
3.2.2 Cultural foundations of civic attitudes
To investigate the cultural foundations of civic attitudes, we look at civic attitudes of people of
different national origins, who face the same economic environment by living in the same coun-
try. This approach allows us to identify the determinants of civic attitudes related to cultural
background independently of the contemporaneous economic and institutional environment.
In line with the previous analysis, we still focus on the question regarding civic attitudes
towards cheating over government benefits. But we use the ISSP database which is the only
16The coefficients reported are the total coefficients. Here, we use the corresponding marginal coefficient when
interpreting the size of the coefficients.
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Table 1: Probit estimation of civic attitudes
Dependent variable Cheat on government benefits :Never justifiable=1
Coeff Std Error
Country dummies Yes***
Male -.067*** (.011)
Age .033*** (.001)
Age2 -.000*** (.000)
Education .035*** (.002)
Political orientation:
Center Reference
Left -.047*** (.014)
Right .090*** (.014)
Religious affiliation:
No_religion Reference
Catholic .010 (.583)
Protestant .085*** (.022)
Buddhist -.001 (.050)
Muslim -.106 (.114)
Jews .000 (.992)
Other_religion .034 (.029)
Pseudo-R2 .098
Observations 60014
WVS database 1980, 1990, 1999-2001
***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
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Figure 5: Marginal country effects associated with the question: “Do you think it can always
be justified, never be justified or something in between to claim government/state benefits to
which you have no rights”. The score associated with the answer ‘never’ is 1, the score of other
answers is zero. Source: WVS, 1980, 1990, 1999—2001.
one to provide information on the country of origin of the respondent’s ancestors. The ques-
tion is provided for the two waves 1991 and 1998 and reads as follows: “Which country or
part of the world did your ancestor come from? If there is more than one country, to which
one of these countries do you feel closer”.17 This question is mainly referenced for the United
States on which our analysis will henceforth be based. In order to use the maximum number
of observations, we group the different countries of origin into the following clusters: Nordic
countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden), European Anglo-Saxon countries (UK
and Ireland), European Continental countries (France and Germany), Mediterranean countries
(Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece), Eastern European countries (Poland) and Latin American
countries. We end up with a sample of 1057 people made up of 317 Anglo-Saxons, 192 Mediter-
ranean, 39 Nordic, 40 Eastern Europeans, 65 Latin Americans and 404 Continental Europeans.
We estimate to what extent the country of origin does matter by using dummies for each cluster
within the United States.
We then assess to what extent the same pattern holds between individuals who are currently
living in the countries of origins. For that purpose we group the different countries into the
17Unfortunately we cannot use the WVS questions in as much as this survey does not document the country
of origin of the ancestors.
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Figure 6: Correlation between the mean reply and the estimated country dummies associated
with the question: “Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in
between to claim government/state benefits to which you have no rights”. The score associated
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same categories as that used for the ancestors’ country of origin within the US. The estimation
is run on the same two waves of the ISSP database.18 The explained variable is still the answer
to the question related to cheating over government benefits and we use the same individual
characteristics as the estimations run on the US.
To disentangle the cultural channel from other national features, we use the following esti-
mation strategy. Let us denote by γi our measure of civic attitudes of individual i. For every
individual i this variable can be explained by
γi = β0 + Fc(i) + β1Xi + εi,
where Xi stands for a vector of individual characteristics such as age, sex, education, income
category and political orientation. εi is a random error term. Fc(i) denotes the dummy variable
for the cluster of countries c where the individual i is currently living. The country effect can
be arbitrarily decomposed into two components: a cultural component θc(i) and another one,
denoted by Ic(i), capturing all other national features.
In the same manner, let us denote by c(j) the cluster of countries of origin of the ancestors
of the individual j currently living in the US. The measure of civic attitudes of individual j in
the US can be estimated by the equation
γj = βUS0 + FUSc(j) + βUS1 Xj + εj,
where FUSc(j) denotes the dummy variable for the cluster of countries c(j) of origin of the ancestors
of individual j. Since FUSc captures the components of civic attitudes inherited from the ancestors
of the cluster c, we define FUSc as the cultural component of civic attitudes coming from cluster
c. This definition allows us to identify the cultural component associated with the cluster c of
countries. As this cultural component is assumed to influence the civic attitudes of individuals
currently living in the US and in cluster c, we can identify the cultural component associated with
cluster c with the dummy variable FUSc . In other words FUSc = θc. Conversely, the component
of civic attitudes of the individuals currently living in the cluster c which are due to national
features different from cultural background is defined by
Ic = Fc − FUSc . (9)
Table 2 reports the probit estimates of the variables FUSc and Fc. The explained variable
is scaled 1 if people say that cheating over government benefits is seriously wrong. Our main
variable of interest is the coefficient associated with the country of origin of the respondent.
18Note that in the ISSP database, the only Latin American country is Chile.
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Households with Nordic origins are still considered as the reference group. As a first step
we estimate the coefficient associated with the other regions of origins without controlling for
individual’s characteristics since most of these characteristics, such as education, income, family
status and religious affiliation, are likely to be endogenous to the cultural backgrounds.
Table 2 - Col. (1), which reports the estimates of the FUSc variables, shows that the fact of
having ancestors from Eastern Europe, Mediterranean countries and above all Latin American
countries, significantly reduces the probability that the respondent considers it seriously wrong
to cheat on government benefits compared to people with Nordic ancestors. The coefficients
are economically sizeable and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Respondents with
Anglo-Saxon or Continental European origins also display lower public-spiritedness, but the gap
with people originating from Nordic countries is not statistically significant.
Table 2 - Col. (2) develops this analysis further by reporting probit estimates of the FUSc
variables when the main individual characteristics are controlled for. The same ordering of
the regions of origins is still at stakes with the significant opposition between Latin American,
Eastern European and Mediterranean countries on one hand, and Nordic countries on the other.
Table 2 - Col. (3) and Col. (4), reports probit estimates of the Fc variables. It shows
that respondents living in Mediterranean, Eastern European and Latin American countries
display much lower civic attitudes than Nordic households. The economic size and the statistical
significance of the estimates of the Fc terms is robust to the inclusion of individual characteristics.
More important: it turns out that the Fc variables are statistically different from zero but
are not statistically different from the FUSc variables at the 99 percent level of confidence.
According to our analysis, this result means that individual attitudes are mainly shaped by the
cultural background, since the component of civic attitudes related to other national features
than cultural background, defined by the variable Ic in equation (9), is not statistically different
from zero for each cluster of countries. This analysis strongly suggests that civic attitudes are
mainly caused by cultural national features that have very long lasting effects.
Note that we have also checked the robustness of the results by also working with the initial
variable about cheating over government benefit, which was initially ranked from one to four.
Tab. 9 (displayed in Appendix E) reports the ordered probit estimates. The results about the
cultural determinants of civic attitudes are consistent with the probit estimates and even more
statistically significant.
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Table 2: National origin and civic attitudes: Probit estimates
Estimations on the US Cross-country estimations
Country of origins Country of residency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nordic Reference
Anglo-Saxon Europe -.281(.215)
-.339
(.222)
-.240***
(.026)
-.270***
(.034)
Continental Europe -.243(.213)
-.271
(.219)
-.381***
(.028)
-.301***
(.038)
Eastern Europe -.482
**
(.243)
-.503*
(.292)
-.742***
(.027)
-.739***
(.032)
Mediterranean -.397
**
(.182)
-.442**
(.220)
-.423***
(.031)
-.439***
(.033)
Latin America -.546
**
(.257)
-.505*
(.269)
-.786***
(.037)
-.746***
(.042)
Men .030(.082)
-.076***
(.021)
Age -.003(.002)
.005
(.007)
Age2 .000(.000)
-.000
(.000)
Education
(in years)
.053***
(.015)
.020***
(.003)
Unemployed Reference
Employed .279(.276)
.191***
(.051)
Inactive .332(.284)
.088
(.053)
Reference
Religious person .285
**
(.112)
.012
(.026)
Income_class: Center Reference
Low -.061(.085)
-.092***
(.023)
High .188(.248)
.191***
(.051)
Pseudo—R2 .018 .026 .082 .095
Nb of informations 1057 1057 15253 15253
ISSP database 1991,1998
A positive sign increases the likelihood that individuals say that it is never
justifiable to claim state benefits to which you have no rights, ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
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3.3 Civic attitudes and economic behavior
For our analysis to be meaningful, heterogeneity in individual civic values should translate into
the same heterogeneity regarding individual economic behavior on the labor market. In partic-
ular, to be consistent with our theoretical explanation, one should expect unemployed people
displaying less guilt feelings in cheating over government benefits to have a higher probability of
remaining unemployed. Besides this correlation should be all the more important that individ-
uals with low civic virtue are currently living in countries providing high government benefits.
Conversely, this correlation should be lower when the propensity to cheat is combined with an
environment in which the probability of getting a job offer is scarce due to stringent employ-
ment protection. We estimate this relationship on the WVS database on the three waves 1980,
1990, 1999-2001. Since theWVS database does nor report the unemployment spells, we cannot
directly estimate a duration model. But we can estimate the correlation between the probability
of being unemployed and the degree of public-spiritedness.
Table 3 reports the cross-country probit estimates of this correlation pattern. The dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent is unemployed during the interview and zero
if she is employed. The degree of civic virtue is still proxied by the answer to the question:
“Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in between to claim
government/state benefits to which you have no rights”. Recall that the answers are originally
scaled from 1 for “Never justifiable” to 10 for “Always justifiable”. Since the interaction between
the different level of civic attitudes, the level of unemployment benefits and the level of job
protection are likely to play a major role in the probability of being unemployed, it is more
instructive at this stage to allow for different values of civic attitudes. We thus work with the
original codification of the answer from 1 to 10 rather than the previous civic dummy which was
equal to zero whatever answers were different to “Never justifiable”.
The other main explanatory variables are the level of government benefits which provides
potential disincentives to work and the employment protection legislation likely to affect the
employment prospects. Concerning the former variable, we use the share of social expenditures
(as defined by the OECD general indicator of social expenditure) in GDP. Social expenditure
includes government spending in unemployment insurance, active labor market policies, health
and housing. We select this variable since it is the closest available to the question at stake
over government benefits. Moreover, this variable is more relevant than the unemployment
replacement rate since it includes all social transfers likely to provide an incentive to remain
unemployed. Regarding the level of employment protection used as a proxy for the scarcity of
job offers, we use the time-varying Nickell et al. (2001) indicator. The higher the level of this
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index is, the more stringent the employment protection becomes. The value-added element of
this indicator compared to that of the OECD is to provide information in the early eighties when
the first wave of theWVS database took place. For both the government benefits indicator and
the employment protection index, we take their values at the time of each three waves in 1980,
1990 and 1999-2001.
We also control for traditional individual characteristics likely to influence the labor market
employment status such as age, degree of education, gender and marital status. Further, we
take into account the previous professional occupation of the respondent by a dummy variable
indicating if the individual never had a job. Eventually, we include country dummies to control
for heterogeneity in national economic environments. The regression is only run on the working
age population, which leaves us with 35,755 observations in the benchmark regression.
Table 3 - Col.1 reports the correlation between the level of civic attitudes and the probability
of being unemployed regardless of national institutions and country dummies. Recall that the
higher the value of the index is, the lower the level of civic attitudes becomes. Consequently,
and as expected, there is a positive correlation between this index and the probability of being
unemployed. This effect is statistically highly significant at the one percent level.
Table 3 - Col.2 includes the index of national employment protection and national government
benefits in the basic regression. Both legislations have an expected positive impact on the
probability of being unemployed. The effect is statistically significant at the one percent level
for the employment protection index and at the 10 percent level concerning government social
expenditures. As previously, a lower level of civic attitudes is still positively and statistically
significantly correlated with the probability of being unemployed.
Table 3 - Col.3 reports the same probit estimations when we control for the interaction terms
between the individual level of civic attitudes and the aggregate national level of government
benefits and employment protection. Strikingly enough, these interactions terms drive all the
correlation patterns. The level of civic attitude by itself is no longer statistically significant.
But the fact that people are ready to cheat on government benefits has a significant positive
impact on the probability of being unemployed if the individual can benefit from high public
social spending. Conversely, the probability of being unemployed decreases marginally if the
individual displays low civic stands but faces scarce job offers proxied by employment protection.
The effect is significant at the one percent level. The other individual characteristics have the
expected sign. The probability of being unemployed decreases with the fact of being a man,
with the level of education, and with the fact of having already occupied a job.
Up to now, it has been shown that there are important cross-country differences in civic
virtue and economic behavior which are shaped to a large extent by national cultural values
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Table 3: Civic attitudes and employment status: Probit estimates
Dependent variable Unemployed status (=1)
Civic attitudes
(Cheat on gov. benefits:
1=never justifiable
to 10=always justifiable)
.038***
(.004)
.039***
(.004)
.031
(.021)
Social spending (share of Gdp) .012
**
(.006)
.628
(.841)
Employment protection .375
**
(.153)
.469***
(.154)
Civic attitudes x Social spending .223
**
(.106)
Civic attitudes x Emp. Protection -.038
***
(.008)
Male (yes=1) .092
***
(.021)
.080***
(.022)
.080***
(.022)
Age -.036
***
(.006)
-.042***
(.006)
-.041***
(.006)
Age2 .000
***
(.000)
.000***
(.000)
.000***
(.000)
Partner (=1) -.306
***
(.033)
-.297***
(.033)
-.331***
(.036)
Education (years) -.029
***
(.003)
-.029***
(.003)
-.029***
(.003)
Never worked (=1) .332
***
(.039)
.290***
(.042)
.289***
(.042)
Country fixed effect Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Pseudo-R2 .070 .061 .062
Observations 35755 35755 35755
WVS database 1980, 1990, 1999-2001
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that have long lasting effects. This result leads us to analyze the correlations between civic
attitudes and labor market institutions and to interpret such correlations as causal relations
that go from civic attitudes to institutions for the period 1980-2003.
3.4 Civic attitudes, institutions and participation rates
Let us now analyze the relation between cross-country differences in civic attitudes and in labor
market institutions and performance. In line with the political economy model, we test whether
countries in which individuals exhibit a higher degree of civic virtue are more prone to insure
workers with unemployment benefits rather than with employment protection. We also estimate
to what extent the labor force participation is influenced by civic attitudes through the design
of labor market institutions.
More precisely, our theoretical model predicts that labor market institutions (unemployment
benefits and employment protection) at date t in country c, denoted by Lct, are determined by
the country’s average level of individual i civic attitudes, denoted by E(γit|c), and other rele-
vant individual characteristics, denoted by Xit. Accordingly, the relation between labor market
institutions and civic attitudes is estimated with the following equation:
Lct = α0 + α1E(γit|c) + α2E(Xit|c) + εct. (10)
The indicator for unemployment benefits is the share of GDP per capita expenditure per
unemployed worker provided by the OECD. The value-added element of this indicator is the
capture of information on both the replacement rate and the spell of unemployment benefits.
Moreover, this indicator is available for all OECD countries including Mexico and the Eastern
European countries. The employment protection legislation is proxied by the OECD index on
regular and temporary contracts.19 Three time-varying indicators are provided for the late 80s,
the late 90s and the early 2000s.
The main explanatory variables of interest for labor market institutions are national civic
attitudes. They are proxied by the country average level of people who never find it justifiable
to cheat on government benefits, computed for each of the three waves of the WVS in 1980,
1990 and 1999-2001. Other explanatory variables found in the political economy literature of
labor market institutions are also taken into account. Agell (2001) argued that the degree of
openness gives rise to more uncertainty for households and could have fuelled their need for
more insurance. The level of insurance is also likely to vary over the business cycles captured
by the growth rate of GDP taken in US 1995 dollars. We also take into account of the level
of qualification of the labor force, proxied by the Barro and Lee index on the average years
19We use the OECD overall EPL1 indicator available at: http://www.oecd.org.
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of education. Eventually we control for the demographic composition on each national labor
market by including the share of the youth population aged between 16 and 24 years old among
the whole working age population (15-64). This demographic composition is likely to play a role
in the demand for insurance and the type of institutions depending on the insiders-outsiders
status. Naturally, a lot of other explanatory variables might be relevant for explaining the level
of employment protection, unemployment benefits and labor force participations but are not
available for an extensive set of countries. We thus control for country fixed effects to capture
other specific national features. We also introduce time period dummies to control for aggregate
shocks.
Since we are interested in causal relationship between civic attitudes and labor market out-
comes, we introduce a lag period between the explained variables and the proxies for civic
attitudes. Namely the average national level of civic attitudes in the waves 1980, 1990 and
1999-2001 explain institutions in the late eighties, the late nineties and the early 2000s respec-
tively. The data for the dependent variable and the other controls are taken as a five year
average over the period 1985-89, 1990-94 and 1999-2003.
Table 4 reports GLS estimates of the determinants of unemployment insurance (UI), employ-
ment protection (EP), and the ratio of these two variables (UI/EP). As a first step, we estimate
the effects of national civic attitudes without any other control, since these attitudes might
influence the overall economic environment. The effects are statistically significant. Table 4 -
Col. (1) shows that a 1 percent increase in the probability of saying that it is never justifiable to
cheat on government benefits relatively to Denmark would increase UI spending by 0.7 percent.
Table 4 - Col. (3) indicates there is a significant correlation between the civic attitudes indicator
and employment protection. If the OECD indicator is rescaled so that it amounts to zero for
the most flexible economy (the US) and to 1 for the most rigid economy (Portugal),20 it turns
out that a 1 percent increase in civic attitudes indicator leads to a 0.6 percent decrease in the
EP indicator. As a matter of fact, Table 4 - Col. (6) shows that a relative increase in national
civic attitudes increases the ratio of UI over EP. The coefficients associated with national civic
attitudes are significant at the 1 percent level for each regression. As a second step, we control
for the economic environment by introducing country fixed-effects and period dummies. The
same relationship holds: a marginal increase in civic attitudes is associated with higher UI, lower
EP and an increase in the overall ratio. The estimated coefficients are still significant at the one
percent level.
Table 5 reports the simultaneous equations estimates. Table 5 - Col.(1) shows the coefficients
estimates when the average national level of civic attitudes are used as the only explanatory
20The OECD overall EPL1 indicator goes from .2 to 4.1.
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variables. It turns out that their effect on labor force going through the UI-EP trade-off is highly
positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. And this correlation is robust to
the inclusion of country fixed effects, as shown by Table 5 - Col.(2). The coefficient estimated
in Col.(2) implies that a one percent increase in the indicator of civic attitudes leads to a 0.14
percent increase21 in the participation rate. Looking at the size of the country marginal effects
in Figure 5, this implies that differences in civic attitudes between Denmark and France, for
instance, may explain between a fifth and a quarter of the difference in labor force participation
rates of young people between these two countries.22
Table 4: Civic attitudes and labor market institutions. GLS estimates. Period: 1980-2003
UI EP UI/EP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average national
level of civic attitudes
.740***
(.153)
.205***
( .051)
-1.306***
(.425)
-4.667***
(1.547)
.439***
(.152)
.878***
(.262)
Openness .119**(.057)
-.140***
(.040)
-.110
(.076)
-.592
(.860)
-.025
(.054)
.193
(.145)
Education -.014(.012)
-.004
(.004)
-.378***
(.009)
.094
(.227)
.027**
(.011)
-.193***
(.048)
GDP growth -.017(.011)
.009**
(.004)
-.091***
(.007)
.234***
(.065)
.001
(.010)
-.044***
(.011)
Fixed Effects No Yes*** No Yes*** No Yes***
Period effects No Yes*** No Yes*** No Yes***
Observations 57 57 40 40 40 40
4 Conclusion
This paper argues that the efficiency of the Danish flexicurity Model relies on strong public-
spiritedness which is absent in many other countries whose labor market institutions are different
from those met in Denmark. From this perspective, the weak public-spiritedness observed in
many European countries may hinder the implementation of the Danish recipe. More generally,
this analysis suggests that public-spiritedness is a key ingredient in the possibility for a society to
implement efficient public unemployment insurance. To that regard, a country may be unlikely
to succeed in its labor market reforms without a comprehensive policy affecting civic behavior
of its citizens.
21This figure is obtained by multiplying the coefficient of the country dummies by the coefficient of UI/EP in
Table 5 - Col. 2.
22The employment rate of young people amounts to .50 in France and .78 in Denmark over the period 1999-2003.
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Table 5: Participation rates of young people (20-24 years old) and civic attitudes. 3SLS esti-
mates. Period: 1980-2003
Labor force UI/EP Labor force UI/EP
(1) (2)
Average national
level of civic attitudes
.468***
(.131)
.863***
(.305)
UI/EP .627***(.143)
.161**
(.080)
Openness -.012(.054)
.265*
(.136)
Education .024**(.011)
-.171***
(.045)
GDP growth -.003(.008)
-.049***
(.011)
Fixed Effects No No Yes*** Yes***
Period effects No No Yes*** Yes***
R2 .15 .35 .94 .92
Observations 40 40 40 40
This conclusion raises many questions about the scope and the instruments of policy reforms.
In particular: how can civic attitudes be changed? Our paper suggests, along with many others
(see Guiso et al., 2005), that it is far from being straightforward to change civic attitudes,
because it turns out that they are largely shaped by cultural heritages and that they are not
systematically influenced by the economic environment. From this point of view, more research is
required to shed light on the relation between public-spiritedness, trust, other elements of social
capital and the economic environment in order to improve our understanding of the dynamics
of values and preferences.
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Appendix
A The equilibrium policy (τ , f, b)
Let us first remark that the system made of the participation constraint (3) and the incentive compatibility
constraint (4) can be written as
v(0) ≥ v(b)− αh¯− γ, (A1)
[1−G(X)] v(w) +G(X)v(b) = v(0) + h¯. (A2)
Therefore, the maximization program of the elected candidate reads
max{w,b,X,h¯}
∫ h¯
0
{[1−G(X)] v(w) +G(X)v(b)} dH(h) +
∫ +∞
h¯
[v(0) + h]dH(h),
subject to ∫ +∞
X
(x−w)dG(x)−G(X)b = k, (A3)
v(0) ≥ v(b)− αh¯− γ, (A4)
[1−G(X)] v(w) +G(X)v(b) = v(0) + h¯. (A5)
Let us denote by L the Lagrangian of this program and by µ1, µ2 and µ3 the Lagrange multipliers
associated with contraints (A3), (A4) and (A5) respectively. The first-order conditions read:23
∂L
∂w = 0⇔ v
′(w) = µ1 − µ3v′(w) (A6)
∂L
∂b = 0⇔ v
′(b) = µ1 + µ2G(X)v
′(b)− µ3v′(b) (A7)
∂L
∂X = 0⇔ X = w − b− [v(w)− v(b)]
(1 + µ3
µ1
)
(A8)
∂L
∂h¯ = 0⇔ µ3 = αµ2 (A9)
The first-order conditions lead us to analyze two cases.
Case 1: γ ≥ (1− α)v
(∫+∞
0 xdG(x)− k
)
− v(0)
In that case, µ2 = 0 implies, according to equations (A9), (A6) and (A7), that b = w. When b = w
and γ ≥ (1− α)v
(∫+∞
0 xdG(x)− k
)
− v(0), the incentive compatibility constraint (A4) is not binding.
Therefore, there is full insurance and equation (A8) implies that X = 0. Then, free entry condition
implies that w = ∫ +∞0 xdG(x)− k.
23 In order to simplify the presentation of the first-order conditions, both sides of constraints (A3), (A4) and
(A5) have been multiplied by H(h¯) > 0.
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Case 2: γ < (1− α)v
(∫+∞
0 xdG(x)− k
)
− v(0)
In that case, µ2 = 0 which still implies, according to equations (A9), (A6) and (A7), that b = w, is
impossible because the incentive compatibility constraint (A4) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, µ2 > 0,
which means that the incentive compatibility constraint (A4) is binding. Equation (A6) can be written
as v′(w) = µ1/(1 + µ3). Substituting this expression into (A8) yields
X = w − b− v(w)− v(b)v′(w) . (A10)
Therefore, the optimal value of (w,X, b) is defined by (A10), the zero profit condition (A3) and the
binding incentive compatibility constraint (A4), where, h¯ is defined by (A5). Then, using (A4) and (A5),
it possible to define the optimal value of (w,X, b) thanks to equations (A10), (A3) and
v(w)− v(b) = (1− α) [v(b)− v(0)]− γα [1−G(X)] 
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B Static comparative properties of b and X
Let us show that the optimal values of X and b are increasing with respect to γ when γ < (1 −
α)v
(∫+∞
0 xdG(x)− k
)
− v(0).
The optimal value of (w,X, b) is defined by the zero profit condition∫ +∞
X
(x−w)dG(x)−G(X)b = k, (B11)
and
X = w − b− v(w)− v(b)v′(w) , (B12)
v(w)− v(b) = (1− α) [v(b)− v(0)]− γα [1−G(X)] . (B13)
The zero profit condition (B11) implicitly defines w as a function ofX and b. Let us denote by w(X, b)
this function, whose partial derivatives are
∂w(X, b)
∂X =
G′(X)
1−G(X) (w −X − b) ,
∂w(X, b)
∂b =
−G(X)
1−G(X) .
When w = w(X, b), the differentiation of equations (B12) and (B13) with respect to X, b and γ yields
db
dγ =
1
α{G(X)v′(w) + [1−G(X) + 1−αα ] v′(b)} > 0, (B14)
dX
dγ =
[v′(b)− v′(w)] [1−G(X)]−G(X) [v(w)− v(b)] v′′(w)v′(w)
[1−G(X)] v′(w)−G′(X)v′′(w) (X −w + b)2
db
dγ > 0. (B15)
The last equation is positive because v is concave and w > b when γ < (1−α)v
(∫+∞
0 xdG(x)− k
)
−v(0)

C Participation rate and the intensity of guilt feelings
Let us show that the participation rate H(h¯) increases with the intensity of guilt feelings. Formally, this
amounts to show that h¯, increases with γ when γ < (1−α)v
(∫+∞
0 xdG(x)− k
)
− v(0). As the incentive
compatibility constraint (A4) is binding, h¯ is defined by αh¯ = v(b)− v(0)− γ. Using equation (B14), the
derivative of h¯ with respect to γ reads
dh¯
dγ =
[v′(b)− v′(w)]G(X)
α [G(X)v′(w) + [1−G(X) + 1−αα ] v′(b)] ,
which is positive because v is concave and w > b when γ < (1− α)v
(∫+∞
0 xdG(x)− k
)
− v(0) 
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D Data and summary statistics
Table 6 reports the sample of countries used in the WVS database and the ISSP database. Table 7
shows the main individual characteristics of the respondents in these two surveys. The variable “Age” is
expressed in years. The variable “Education” is the age at which the respondent completed her highest
education. The variable “Income” derives from the question : “Here is a scale of incomes. We would
like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other income
that come in”. The variable is ranked into deciles. We constructed three categories: low income (1th-3th
deciles), mean income (4th-6th) and high income (7th-10th).
Table 6: Sample of countries in WVS and ISSP
Country WVS (1980, 1990, 1999-2001) ISSP (1991, 1998)
Observations Observations
Australia 3131 1310
Austria 2840 1986
Belgium 5508
Canada 4844 974
Chile 2677 1503
Czech Republic 2790 1224
Denmark 2807 1114
France 3725 1133
Germany 5382 2346
Greece 1107
Hungary 3311 2000
Ireland 3199 2015
Italy 5328 1991
Japan 3378 1368
Mexico 4761
Netherlands 3038 3655
Norway 3558 3038
Poland 1998 2210
Portugal 2168 1201
Spain 8778 2488
Slovakia 1317 1284
Sweden 2854 1189
Switzerland 2491 1204
United Kingdom 3573 2061
United States 5242 2643
Figures 7 and 8 report the original ranking of answers related to civic attititudes towards cheating
on governement benefits in the WVS database and ISSP database. In the WVS database, the answers
are given on an ordering scale of 1 for “Never justifiable” to 10 for “Always justifiable”. In the ISSP
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Table 7: Summary statistics of WVS and ISSP
Variables WVS ISSP
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Men 0.481 0.5 0.469 0.499
Age 42.807 17.278 46.228 17.332
Age education 17.317 3.582 11.845 3.885
Low-income 0.426 0.494 0.418 0.493
Mid-income 0.236 0.498 0.485 0.5
Up-income 0.339 0.473 0.097 0.296
Catholics 0.413 0.492 0.379 0.485
Protestants 0.322 0.467 0.289 0.453
Muslims 0.043 0.202 0.003 0.051
Jews 0.005 0.074 0.002 0.043
Buddhists 0.025 0.155 0.02 0.139
Others 0.025 0.155 0.032 0.175
No religion 0.168 0.374 0.268 0.443
database, the answer ranges from 1 to 4, which correspond to “Seriously wrong”, “Wrong”, “A bit wrong”
and “Not wrong”. For both surveys, the answers are averaged on the different waves (three waves in the
WVS in 1980, 1990, 1999-2001) and two waves in the ISSP database (1991, 1998)).
In both surveys respondents were asked a question directly related to civic attitudes towards govern-
ment benefits. The question reported in theWVS database reads as follows: “Do you think it can always
be justified, never be justified or something in between to claim government/state benefits to which you
have no rights”. The answers are given on an ordering scale of 1 for “Never justifiable” to 10 for “Always
justifiable”. The wording in the ISSP database is somehow similar: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong
if a person gives the government incorrect information about himself/herself to get government benefits
that she/ he is not entitled to?”. The answer ranges from 1 to 4, which correspond to “Seriously wrong”,
“Wrong”, “A bit wrong” and “Not wrong”.
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Figure 7: “Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in between to
claim government/state benefits to which you have no rights”. From 1=“Never justifiable” to
10“Always justifiable”. WVS: 1980,1990, 1999-2001.
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Figure 8: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a person gives the government incorrect
information about himself/herself to get government benefits that she/ he is not entitled to?”.
The answer ranges from 1=“Seriously wrong” to 4=“Not wrong”. ISSP 1991,1999
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E Ordered Probit estimations
We also check the robustness of our estimations when one works with the original codification of the
answers regarding civic attitudes rather than the constructed civic dummy variable used in the core of
the text.
Tab 8 reports ordered probit estimates of the influence of individual characteristics and country fixed
effects when one works with the original WVS variable. The answers are coded from 1 for high level of
civic attitude to 10 for low level of civic attitudes. Thus a negative sign increases the probability that
the associated characteristic decrease the level of public-spiritidness. We run the same estimations with
the same controls and over the same period as in Section 3.2.1
Table 8: Ordered probit estimation of civic attitudes
Dependent variable
Justifiable to cheat on
governement benefits
1=Never to 10=Always
Coeff Std Error
Country dummies Yes***
Male .066*** (.010)
Age -.032*** (.001)
Age2 .000*** (.000)
Education -.008*** (.001)
Political orientation:
Center Reference
Left .117*** (.012)
Right -.071*** (.012)
Religious affiliation:
No_religion Reference
Catholic -.118*** (.017)
Protestant -.166*** (.021)
Buddhist -.081 (.046)
Muslim .124 (.092)
Jews -.100 (.078)
Other_religion -.111 (.025)
Pseudo-R2 .061
Observations 56311
WVS database 1980, 1990, 1999-2001
***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
Tab 9 reports ordered probit estimates of civic attitudes on the ISSP database. The variable is
coded from 1 for the highest level of civic virtue to 4 for the lowest value of civicness. Thus a negative
sign increases the probability that the associated characteristic decreases civic virtue. We run the same
41
estimations within the United-States and then across the clusters of countries as in Section 3.2.2.
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Table 9: National origin and civic attitudes: Ordered probit estimates
Estimations on the US Cross-country estimations
Country of origins Country of residency
(1) (2)
Nordic Reference
Anglo-Saxon Europe -.261(.219)
-.388***
(.057)
Continental Europe -.298(.217)
-.574***
(.057)
Eastern Europe -.624
**
(.279)
-.737***
(.056)
Mediterranean -.451
**
(.226)
-.641***
(.049)
Latin America -.642
**
(.260)
-1.02***
(.056)
Men -.018(.078)
-.066***
(.015)
Age -.001(.002)
.007
(.007)
Age2 .000(.000)
-.000
(.000)
Education
(in years)
.044***
(.015)
.014***
(.002)
Unemployed Reference
Employed .337(.245)
.228***
(.036)
Inactive .375(.254)
.145***
(.037)
Reference
Religious person .323
***
(.105)
.076***
(.020)
Income_class: Center Reference
Low -.108(.081)
-.099**
(.017)
High .137(.237)
.016
(.025)
Pseudo-R2 .024 .043
Nb of informations 1008 15023
ISSP database 1991,1998
A positive sign increases the likelihood that individuals say that it is never
justifiable to claim state benefits to which you have no rights, ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
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